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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5246
The returns to schooling or the skill premium is a key 
parameter in various literatures, including globalization 
and inequality and international migration. This paper 
explores the skill premium and its link to exports in Latin 
America, thus linking the skill premium to the emerging 
literature on the structure of trade and development. 
Using data on employment and wages for over five 
million workers in sixteen Latin American economies, 
the authors estimate national and industry-specific 
skill premiums and study some of their determinants. 
The evidence suggests that both country and industry 
This paper—a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region and the Trade 
and Integration Team, Development Research Group, and—is part of a larger effort in the both departments to assess the 
role of the structure of international trade in development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dlederman@worldbank.org.  
characteristics are important in explaining skill 
premiums. The analysis also suggests that the incidence 
of exports within industries, the average income per 
capita within countries, and the relative abundance of 
skilled workers are related to the underlying industry and 
country characteristics that explain skill premiums. In 
particular, higher sectoral exports are positively linked 
with the skill premium at the industry level, a result that 
supports recent trade models linking exports with wages 
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This paper investigates the skill premium in Latin America and the Caribbean. Estimates
of the eect of additional years of education on wages|the skilled-wage premium|are often
interpreted as a measure of the returns to schooling and of the private benets of education,
which tend to be lower than the social or aggregate returns to education (Krueger and
Lindahl, 2001).1 Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999) have launched a voluminous literature
that documents the better performance of exporting rms vis- a-vis rms that sell in domestic
markets. This work, thoroughly reviewed in Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007),
has established that exporters are larger, are more productive, hire more workers, and pay
higher wages.2 In this paper, we expand this work by investigating the association between
exporting and the skill premium.
In the literature on international trade, the skilled-wage premium has been at the center
of the work on the link between globalization and the income distribution. In their review of
the literature, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) highlight the central role played by the returns
to schooling parameter insofar as trade-induced skill-biased technical change could be an
important channel through which globalization has benetted skilled workers relative to
unskilled workers, thus helping to explain why developing countries experienced increases in
income inequality during recent decades.
The skill premium also plays an important role in the literature on international migra-
tion and the brain drain (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001). A central concern in this
literature is that the education of workers in developing countries might lead to out migration
of skilled workers who seek higher returns to their skills in developed economies. Thus the
issue of the so-called brain drain has permeated policy discussions about the developmental
consequences of public education policies in poor countries.
In spite of the central role played by the returns to schooling parameter in various litera-
1That is, there is little evidence that omitted variables, such as inherent ability or talent (i.e., self-selection
of talented individuals into education) have biased estimates of the returns to education (Krueger and Lindahl
2001, p. 1101).
2For details, see Bernard and Wagner (1997), Isgut (2001), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Alvarez and Lopez
(2005), De Loecker (2007), Schank, Schnabel, and Wagner (2007), Verhoogen (2008), Clerides, Lach, and
Tybout (1998), Pavcnik (2002), and Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang (2008).
1tures of importance for developing countries, there has been surprisingly little research about
the relative roles played by industrial structure versus national characteristics in develop-
ing countries. If skill-wage premiums vary systematically across industries, then industrial
policies that favor one sector over another could have important consequences for closing
the gap between the private and social returns to education, for reducing the scope of the
brain drain due to emigration of highly educated workers, and for aecting the relation-
ship between globalization and income inequality. Hence this paper can also be seen as a
contribution to the literature on whether the industrial composition of exports matter for
development (e.g., Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrk 2005).
Our objective in this paper is to explore the industry-skill premium in Latin America and
the Caribbean. We work with sixty four household surveys for sixteen countries covering
over ve million workers in the region. Following the literature on industry wage dierentials
(Dickens and Katz, 1986; Dickens and Lang, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1992), we allow the
skill premiums to vary across industries, as in Galiani and Porto (2009).3 Using the household
surveys, we estimate and document the industry-specic skill premiums for sixty industries
in each of the sixteen countries in the region.
We then work with those estimates to study econometrically the relationship between the
industry-skill premiums and the level of sectoral exports. Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto
(2009) review theories to explain a link between exports and the skill premium based on skill-
intensive activities associated with exporting. These include marketing activities as well as
quality upgrades (labeling, warranties, certication) needed to export. Using rm-level data,
the authors nd support for such a link. In this paper, we generate additional supportive
evidence for models of exports and skills. In cross-country, cross-industry regressions, we
nd a positive and statistically signicant link between the industry-skill premium and the
level of sectoral exports. This link, however, is not large in magnitude: doubling sectoral
exports (a reasonable shock in our data) is associated with a 0.28 percentage point increase
in the manufacturing-industry skill premium.
The related analytical issues have important policy implications. Most countries in Latin
3The existence of skill premiums at the industry level requires some sort of labor immobility. In Galiani
and Porto, 2009, this is generated by union membership.
2America and the Caribbean currently pursue various export-promotion policies, including
trade liberalization, export-processing zones, and export promotion agencies. One of the jus-
tications for such policies is the apparent existence of wage premiums for workers employed
by rms that sell a large share of their production abroad. If sectoral wage premiums are
in fact related to foreign markets, then export-promotion policies could be welfare enhanc-
ing. More generally, industry-specic policies, including other forms of industrial policies,
could help reduce the gap between the private and social returns to schooling. The evidence
reported in this paper can help guide these policy options.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports several estimates of av-
erage skill premiums for the countries under investigation: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. To test their robustness, we discuss
results from various model specications that dier in terms of denitions of skilled workers,
sub-samples of the data, and econometric estimators. In addition, the analyses in Sec-
tion 2 assess whether international dierences in skill premiums are associated with relative
endowments of skilled workers, heterogeneity in the composition of skilled workers, or het-
erogeneity in gender-specic skill premiums. Section 3 presents estimates of industry-specic
skill premiums for 60 tradable and non-tradable sectors covered by the employment survey
data, including 23 manufacturing sectors. After a brief analytical discussion of inter-industry
wage dierentials and the role of exports, Section 4 discusses the empirical analysis of ex-
ports as determinants of the skilled premium in manufacturing sectors. Section 5 concludes
by summarizing the main ndings.
2 Estimation of National Skill Premiums
We start by estimating national wage premiums paid to skilled workers using household-level
data from sixteen Latin American economies: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. The data include information on wages,
3skills, industry aliation and characteristics of workers from 64 dierent household surveys.
Details of the household surveys, years of data and number of observations are found in
Table 1. For each country we have between two (Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua) and seven
(Dominican Republic) years of data, ranging from 2000 to 2006, for a total of around 60,000
(Nicaragua) to 1,150,000 (Brazil) observations per country. Adding across countries and
years, we have over ve million observations.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on education and skill levels of the workers. The
rst two columns show sharp dierences in the average number of years of education and in
the share of skilled workers (dened as individuals who hold a high school diploma) across
countries. Average years of education are comparatively high in Argentina (10.63), Uruguay
(9.82), Chile (8.89), Panama (8.81), Colombia (8.53), and Ecuador, the Dominican Republic
and Mexico (around 7.9). These countries also show the highest share of skilled workers,
ranging from 27 percent in Mexico to 52 percent in Argentina (in Colombia, instead, the share
is relatively lower). The lowest years of education are observed in Nicaragua, Guatemala
and Honduras (5.31, 5.70, and 5.99) but the lowest share of skilled workers are observed
in Nicaragua and Brazil (9 and 13 percent). In the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, the
relatively high averages are partly explained by survey design because the surveys cover only
urban households. In the other fourteen countries the surveys are representative of the rural
as well as urban populations.
Columns 3 and 4 compare male and female workers. For some countries the share of
skilled workers is higher among females than among males, most noticeably in Argentina,
Brazil, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Panama. This dierence ranges between 4 and
7 percentage points. In contrast, in Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala
the share of skilled workers is between 2 and 6 percentage points higher among males than
females.
It is also informative to look at skilled workers at a ner level of disaggregation, as
workers of dierent educational levels are grouped together in the skilled category. Column
5 presents the share of highly-skilled workers conditional on being skilled, that is, the share
of workers with more than a high school diploma (individuals with tertiary education, some
4college experience, college degree, and graduate degrees) in the total number of workers with
at least a high school diploma. This statistic indicates the composition of skilled labor in
each country. The dierences across countries are again very sharp, thus implying that the
composition of the skilled labor force varies across countries. Countries with high shares of
highly-skilled workers in the skilled group (41 to 56 percent) are Colombia, Peru, Mexico
and Nicaragua. Notice, for instance, that because Nicaragua has the lowest skill share, the
relatively few workers with degrees tend to reach a high educational attainment. Countries
with low shares of highly-skilled workers are El Salvador, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile (19
to 23 percent). The participation of highly-skilled workers in the total labor force can be
obtained by multiplying column 5 by column 2.
To estimate the returns to skill in each country, we pool data from all years and estimate
Mincer-type regressions with the log hourly wage of each worker explained by individual
worker characteristics. The main variable of interest is a binary variable that indicates
whether the worker is skilled or unskilled. The equation takes the following standard form:
(1) lnwijt = 
Skijt + x
0
ijt + j + t + "ijt;
Subscript i denotes individuals, j the industry of employment, and t denotes years. There
is a separate equation for each country (country subscripts are dropped). The hourly wage
is given by w. It is computed as the reported weekly wage divided by the number of hours
worked per week.4 We dene skilled workers as those with a high school diploma or more.
Thus, the binary variable Sk is equal to one if the individual has at least a high school
diploma. The coecient 
 measures the skill premium, that is, the percentage dierence
in wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. We control for individual charac-
teristics in the vector x and for industry and year eects in the indicator variables t and
j. The controls included in x are gender, age and age squared, marital status, whether
the individual works full-time or part-time, a dummy for individuals in rural areas, and
regional dummies. The estimates from these equations are correlations from cross-sections
4In several surveys these data refer to the total wages received and number of hours worked during the
week prior to the survey.
5of workers, which raises econometric issues that have been discussed at length in the labor
literature (see, for example, Griliches 1977, Card 1999, and Krueger and Lindahl 2001). A
key concern in this literature is that the estimated correlations capture the ability or talent of
workers, which is correlated with both educational attainment and wages, which would yield
upwardly biased estimates of the returns to schooling. On the other hand, because wages
and educational attainment are reported by the surveyed workers, the estimates might suer
from attenuation bias due to random reporting errors.5 Therefore, the econometric results
should be interpreted as reduced-form coecients measuring the average dierence in wages
between skilled and unskilled workers, not as predictions of the wages that would be received
by individual workers who enter the skilled-workers category.
In a second specication, we dene two groups of skilled workers: semi-skilled workers
(those with a high school diploma) and highly-skilled workers (those with tertiary education,
some college, a college degree, or a graduate education). In this case we include two binary
variables, Sk1 for the semi-skilled and Sk2 for the highly-skilled, as shown in the following
equation:










ijt + j + t + "ijt;
The coecients 
1 and 
2 measure the wage premium for semi-skilled and highly-skilled
workers. Both coecients are dened relative to unskilled workers.
To estimate the returns to skills in equations (1) and (2), we restrict the sample to
employed workers (the wage of unemployed workers is zero) between 22 and 65 years of age.
We drop employed workers who report a wage of zero. Results are reported in Table 3.
Estimates of equation (1) are presented in column (1) of Table 3. The coecients are
interpreted as the percentage dierence in wages between skilled (high school diploma) and
unskilled workers. For example, in Ecuador the wage of an employed individual with a
5Krueger and Lindahl (2001, p. 1101) conclude in their literature review that there is surprisingly little
evidence of ability bias in estimates of the returns to schooling. For our purposes, ability bias is not a serious
concern because there is no reason to believe that the magnitude of the ability bias varies across countries.
It may vary systematically across industries, which is the focus of sections 3 and 4 below. However, we do
want to capture complementarities between unobserved worker ability and skills allocated across sectors.
6high school diploma is, on average and after controlling for observable worker characteristics
and industry aliation, 53 percent higher than the wage of an employed unskilled worker.
Coecients range from 38 to 98 percent. Brazil and Colombia show the highest returns
to skill|over 90 percent. Countries with returns to skill over 60 percent are Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico and Chile. In Paraguay and Ecuador the skill
premium is above 50 percent. In the remaining countries|Dominican Republic, Panama,
Argentina, El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay|the skill premium ranges from 49 to 38 percent.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 present results from equation (2), where the skill premium
is split into the premium for semi-skilled workers and highly-skilled workers. Both premiums
are interpreted relative to the unskilled category. Thus, in Costa Rica, semi-skilled workers
earn on average 56 percent more than unskilled workers, and highly-skilled individuals earn
close to 100 percent more than the unskilled. Across countries, the premium for semi-skilled
workers ranges from 24 to 84 percent; the premium for highly-skilled workers ranges from 62
to 116 percent. In general, countries with a high premium for the semi-skilled also exhibit a
high premium for the highly-skilled. The correlation between the two measures is 0.76.
The samples used to obtain the results described above include workers in all sectors
of the economy and the estimates consequently reveal patterns of skill premiums at the
national level. Because section 4 below is about the relationship between industry-specic
skill premiums and exports, we also estimated the average skill premium restricting the
sample to workers employed in manufacturing sectors only. Our estimates of skill premiums
do not dier much from the baseline case where all workers are included in the regressions. To
test the robustness of the results, we have also restricted the sample to full time workers only
and have also experimented with a median regression, which is theoretically less sensitive
to outliers. Again, results are very close to the baseline specication. These results are not
shown in Table 3, but are available in Table A1 in the on-line appendix.6
Our results uncover considerable dierences in the returns to skill across countries. One
obvious explanation for the dierences in skill premiums could be factor endowments. Com-
paring the returns to skill presented in column (1) with the skill endowments in Table 2,
6The link is http://sites.google.com/site/guidoportounlp/.
7column (2), we nd a negative association between the skill ratio and the skill premium.
The correlation between the two variables is {0.64.
Another plausible explanation for the estimated cross-country dierences in the average
skill premium is gender dierences in returns to skill, which could vary across countries as a
consequence of cultural attitudes and social norms related to gender. Gender dierences in
the returns to schooling could also be due to country dierences in industrial structure, with
some industries employing relatively more (less) female workers with dierent skill levels.
For example, export assembly operations ("maquilas") are known to employ more women
than men, and these industries tend to be located in economies that are close to the U.S.
market. To explore this possibility, we allow the skill premium to vary by gender by adding
an interaction term to the baseline regression:
(3) lnwijt = 
Skijt + e 
Skijt  Mijt + x
0
ijt + j + t + "ijt;
where M is a binary variable that is equal to one for males (the gender dummy is separately
included in x). The skill premium for females is given by 
, while the premium for males is
given by 
 + e 
, where e 
 represents the dierential skill premium for males. In the case of
two skill groups, the regression equation is
















ijt  Mijt + x
0
ijt + j + t + "ijt;
where e 
1 and e 
2 are the dierential premiums for semi-skilled and highly-skilled males rela-
tive to females.
Results for the dierential premiums are displayed in columns (4) to (6) of Table 3. They
range from negative 14 percent to positive 15 percent. Countries with a positive dierential
for males are Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Chile. In almost all other countries, with
the exception of a few results that are not statistically signicant, the male dierential is
negative and signicant, which implies that the gender wage gap is lower among skilled than
among unskilled workers. For most countries, splitting skilled workers into semi-skilled and
highly-skilled does not aect the direction of the gender dierence in skill premiums, but
8there are signicant international dierences in the gender-specic skill premiums.
Because the pattern of these gender-specic premiums is somewhat erratic across coun-
tries, our results suggest that the cross-country dierences in skill premiums are more likely
due to dierences in relative factor endowments than to gender dierences. Additional sup-
port for this conclusion comes from a simplistic regression model with the national skill
premium as the dependent variable (and a corresponding sample of sixteen observations)
and these two explanatory variables. The results (not reported) show that only the ratio of
skilled over unskilled workers is statistically signicant with a coecient estimate of {0.90
and a corresponding p-value for the null hypothesis of 0.02. The male-specic skill premium
by country is not statistically signicant. In fact, the estimate of the skill endowment vari-
able changes only slightly, to {1.0 (from {0.90) after the exclusion of the gender-specic
premium.
Another plausible explanation for the large dierences in skill premiums across countries
could be the composition of skill groups. Skilled workers are far from homogeneous. In
particular, the highly-skilled group includes individuals with tertiary education, some college,
a college degree, and a postgraduate degree. Table 4 presents the skill premiums of ve
groups: individuals who completed elementary school, individuals who did not nish high
school, high school graduates, individuals with some college or tertiary education, and college
graduates. The results are markedly dierent across countries even for these arguably more
homogeneous groups. Moreover, the average of the ve coecients is highly correlated with
the skill premium in that same country (the correlation is 0.72). Thus far, it seems that the
skill endowments are our preferred country-level correlate of national skill premiums, but in
subsequent exercises (reported in Table 12) we explore the role of the level of development,
proxied by GDP per capita.
3 Industry-Specic Skill Premiums
This section explores dierences in skill premiums at the industry level. In models with per-
fect factor mobility, wages equalize across sectors and there should thus be an aggregate skill
9premium aecting all skilled workers in the labor market. With departures from that model,
including imperfect factor mobility of skilled labor (but also of unskilled labor), wage equal-
ization does not follow, and skill premiums at the industry level can result in equilibrium. To
investigate this scenario, we expand our previous model to estimate skill premiums by sector.
Specically, we multiply the skill categories, using the dierent denitions described above,
by dummy variables for each industry code at the 2-digit International Standard Industry
Classication (ISIC) Revision 3.7 The coecient on this interaction provides an estimate
(relative to the industry of reference) of industry-specic skill premiums.
At the 2-digit level, there are 60 sectors in the ISIC Revision 3 classication. With a
sample of 16 countries, we estimate approximately 960 industry-skill premiums (which are
listed in Table A2 of the on-line Appendix). There are signicant dierences in the skill
premiums, both across sectors for a given country and across countries for a given sector.
Table 5 presents the distribution of industry-skill premiums within countries. Consistent
with the estimates of the aggregate skill premiums (Table 3), there are wide dierences
in the average (and median) skill premium across countries that unsurprisingly mimic the
patterns observed in Table 3. Figure 1 also illustrates the notable dispersion in the estimated
skill premiums across industries within countries.
In addition, there is considerable dispersion in the average skill premium across countries
(for a given industry). Table 6 reports the top-10 industries with the highest cross-country
average skill premium (average computed across countries for a given industry) and the
bottom-10 industries with the lowest cross-country average premiums. The cross-country
averages in the skill premium range from 1.12 in sector 99 (\Extra-territorial organization and
bodies") to 0.13 in sector 95 (\Private households with employed persons"). Additionally, we
construct industry rankings for each country. Columns (3), (4) and (5) report the fraction of
countries for which a given industry ranks in the top 50 percent, top 25 percent, and bottom
25 percent. Heterogeneity in the rankings of the skill premiums even within the highest-
and lowest-ranked sectors is apparent. For instance, the skill premium in sector 99 (with
the highest average) is above the median only in 88 percent of the countries, while for 13
7For those surveys that do not use ISIC Rev.3 to classify industries, concordance tables were utilized.
10percent of the countries the industry ranks in the bottom 25 percent. In contrast, sector 74
(\Other business activities") has the third-highest average skill premium but the individual
skill premiums are above the median in all countries. As another example of heterogeneity,
Sector 62 (Air transport) is third from the bottom in cross-country average, and, while it
ranks in the bottom 25 percent for 42 percent of countries, it is in the top 25th-percentile
for 25 percent of countries.8
We also investigated the dispersion of skill premiums (across sectors and countries) for
the semi-skilled and highly-skilled categories. Table 7, in Panels A and B, reports cross-
sector average premiums for these two groups within each country. There is still signicant
dispersion in the premiums. For the highly-skilled, for instance, the highest average premium
is estimated for Chile (1.23) and the lowest for Uruguay (0.64). For the semi-skilled, the
highest premium appears in Brazil (0.88) and the lowest in Peru (0.27) and Uruguay (0.24).
To examine the pattern of skill premiums across countries, Table 8 reports average pre-
miums for the highly-skilled for each sector across countries, but similar conclusions can be
drawn for the semi-skilled. Panel A displays the top-10 sectors with the highest premiums,
which include ve sectors that were also top-10 sectors in Table 6 and ve others. The
highest-ranked sector, for instance, is now \Manufacture of radio, television, and commu-
nication equipment." A similar pattern emerges for the bottom-10 sectors with the lowest
premiums (always within the highly-skilled). These results reinforce the observation that
the skill premiums vary considerably across country and across industries. The following
section analyzes potential determinants of industry-specic premiums.
8Sectors with consistently high premiums include \Other business activities,"\Agriculture and hunting,"
\Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products," and \Health and Social Work". Sectors with consis-
tently low premiums are \Hotels and Restaurants," \Land transport, transport via pipelines," and \Private
households with employed persons." It is also noteworthy that, in the high-ranked and low-ranked sectors,
manufacturing sectors (typically tradable) rank with services and non-tradable sectors.
114 Exports as a Determinant of Industry-Specic Skill
Premiums
Skill premiums are aected by numerous factors, including demand and supply conditions,
policies, and various shocks. Our interest in the correlates of skill premiums is motivated by
the literature on wages paid by exporters relative to non-exporters. This literature, pioneered
by Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), documented the better performance of exporting rms
in terms of employment, wages, and productivity. This work has been complemented and
expanded by numerous researchers (see for instance the review in Bernand, Jensen, Redding,
and Schott 2007): the superior performance of exporting rms (as well as importing rms) is
now clearly established. In a related paper, Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2009) develop
a model of exports and skills tested with rm data from Argentina. The ongoing explores a
reduced-form analysis to generate evidence in support of claim that the level of exports is a
key determinant of the skill premium.
Two leading theories explain this potential link between industry exports and skill pre-
miums. One argues that the act of exporting requires activities that are skill-intensive,
although the production of the good may require unskilled labor. Exporting rms, and
therefore industries with more exports in general, will thus demand higher skills and pay a
higher skill premium. The alternative theory argues that exporting is associated with higher
prots (because more productive rms self select into exports) and these higher prots are
shared with the workers via prot sharing rules.
The theory focusing on the need to engage in skill-intensive activities in order to export
a product is based on Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2009). For our present purposes, we
assume that skilled labor is imperfectly mobile, as in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Ferreira
et al. (2008), and Galiani and Porto (2009). Unskilled workers are perfectly mobile across
sectors and earn the economy-wide competitive wage, wu. While total labor supply in a
given industry may be xed due to labor specicity, workers can be induced to supply more
eort at higher oered wages. In Figure 2, for instance, the relationship between eective
skilled labor supply in industry j and skilled wages ws is increasing (the function Ls(ws)).
12Exporting requires both the production of the physical units of the product and the
provision of export services. These services include labeling, marketing, technical support,
consumer support (webpage, email, warranty).9 Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2009)
assume that these export services are skill-intensive activities because they require the eort
Ls of highly skilled managers and engineers. It follows that the demand for the eort of
skilled labor in industry j will depend on the level of exports of the industry.10 In Figure
2, we plot two such demand functions for two industries with dierent levels of exports,
ExpH > ExpL; the high-export industry has a higher demand for skilled workers.
As Figure 2 shows, the high-export sector pays higher wages to their skilled workers.
Since the wage oered to the unskilled workers is assumed to be the same across industries
(given by the competitive national market for unskilled labor), it follows that high-export
sectors pay a higher skilled premium.
An alternative theory is based on prot sharing mechanisms. In the trade literature,
prot sharing originates in a fair-wage hypothesis, as in Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and
Amity and Davis (2008). In short, skilled workers demand a wage premium to exert the
necessary eort because it is considered fair to share the prots of the rms. In consequence,
while marginal rms pay the competitive outside wage, more protable rms pay increasingly
higher wages. In Figure 3, this is represented by the fair-wage constraint ws = (), where
() is increasing in the level of prots .
Prots, on the other hand, are a decreasing function of the wages oered to skilled
workers. This is represented by the function (ws) in Figure 3. In addition, following Melitz
(2003), we assume that prots are higher for exporters, and consequently the prot function
(ws) of high export sectors are higher, for a given level of wages, than in low export sectors.
In equilibrium, high-export rms oer higher wages ws to skilled workers. Together with
competitive labor markets for unskilled labor with equilibrium wages wu and some degree
of specicity of skilled labor (as before), in the end the industry-specic skill premium is an
increasing function of the level of sectoral exports.
9In Manasse and Turrini (2001) and Verhoogen (2008), exporting requires quality upgrades.
10The demand for unskilled labor may depend on exports. For illustration purposes, this is not really
relevant in our discussion. See Brambilla, Lederman, and Porto (2009) for details.
13It is worth noting that the theories described above imply that exports either demand
higher skills (observed and unobserved, thus including innate worker ability) or oer higher
prots, which can be shared with skilled workers. The empirical exercises that follow, how-
ever, should not be interpreted strictly as as tests of exports as causing high skill premiums.
This would be the case only if exports are strictly exogenous and industry-specic demand
for skilled workers does not by itself cause exports. As will become apparent, it is somewhat
comforting that the eects of industry-specic exports appear correlated with skill premiums
even after controlling for industry-specic eects. Still, the results must be interpreted with
caution because it does not follow that skilled workers that move from an industry with low
estimated premiums to another with higher premiums will receive higher wages. This is so
because industries and exports may require specic skills that may not be transferable to
other activities.
4.1 Country and Industry Eects
In the remainder of this section, we exploit our estimates of industry-specic skill premi-
ums for Latin America to provide evidence in support of the claim that they are positively
correlated with sectoral exports. As a rst step, we assess the role of country and industry
dummies. More specically, the industry-skill premium is explained by i) country dummies
alone; ii) industry dummies alone; iii) country and industry dummies. For each of these mod-
els, we report in Table 9 the R2 (adjusted) and the F-test of joint signicance of each set of
dummies. We do this for all sectors, for the manufacturing sectors, and for the non-tradable
(and services sectors).
If we include all sectors, country dummies alone account for 20 percent of the variance of
the skill premium while industry dummies alone account for almost 48 percent. Both sets of
dummies jointly explain around 69.2 percent of the variation in the industry-skill premium.
The dummies are always jointly statistically signicant. In this case, it appears that the
industry dummies play a more important role than country dummies. It should be kept in
mind, however, that the comparison of R2s is a descriptive assessment of the role of the
dummies in explaining the variance of the dependent variable. For reference, Tables 10 and
1411 list the estimated dummy-variable coecients for countries and industries. The omitted
categories are agriculture and Argentina.
If the sample is restricted to the manufacturing sector (second panel of Table 9), we
see that country dummies and industry dummies are more or less equally important in
explaining the dependent variable. As before, both sets of dummies are jointly signicant.
Finally, when we consider only non-tradable and services sectors (bottom panel of Table 9),
the industry dummies appear to be much more relevant than the country dummies. Once
again, the two sets of dummies are jointly signicant.
4.2 Exports and the Skill Premium
As mentioned, sectoral exports could be an important determinant of the industry-specic









jc + j + c + jc;
where zjc may include country or industry dummies or both, and characteristics of industry
j in country c. The model is estimated with weighted least squares. This GLS strategy
accounts for the fact that the industry-specic skill premiums are estimated (in equations
(1) or (2)) for instance. The weights are thus the inverse of the standard errors. Notice that
we use OLS as the best linear predictor of the regression function and we do not attach any
causal relationship to our estimates. In fact, our regression results have a clear reduced-form
interpretation to illustrate whether the data support any link between sectoral exports and
the sectoral skill premiums.
Table 12 presents the results. Column (1) shows the estimate of the model when the skill
premiums are regressed on a constant and the log of the ratio of exports over GDP. The
estimate for  is positive and signicant, thus suggesting that the skill premium rises with
exports. The estimate in column (1) implies that doubling a sector's share of exports over
GDP (or a change in the log of exports over GDP equal to one) is associated with an increase
of 0.0028 in the skill premium, i.e., the wage dierential between skilled and unskilled workers
15rises by 0.28 percentage points. Notice that the simulated shock of a change of 1 in the log of
exports over GDP is reasonable because the standard deviation of the variable in our sample
is about 2.1. Thus this association is positive and signicant but it is not very large.
In columns (2) to (5) of Table 12, we perform several robustness tests. Column (2) shows
the results from the estimation of (7) with industry dummies. The incidence of industry
exports remains signicant, with a similar magnitude as in column (1). Column (3) includes
country dummies only, and the link between exports and the skill premium disappears. In
Column (4), we include both sets of dummies and the link disappears, too. Controlling for
both country and industry dummies might be too restrictive, however. Country xed eects
explain about a third of the variation in skill premiums, and both country and industry
dummies account for about 60 percent. This leaves little room for exports to explain the
skill premium because much of the variation of the dependent variable is attenuated by
the dummies. To learn more about the role of sectoral exports, we work with a more
parsimonious version of equation (7) where instead of country dummies we control for country
characteristics, namely the log of per capita GDP and the ratio of skilled (high school
completed) over unskilled labor. These results are reported in column (5) of Table 12.
Both per capita GDP and the skill composition are statistically signicant determinants of
the industry-skill premiums with the expected signs: richer countries seem to have greater
disparities between skilled and unskilled wages, and, as expected, countries with a greater
fraction (supply) of skilled workers pay smaller skill premiums. The signicance of these
variables supports their use in lieu of the country xed eects. Also, the R2 of the model
remains high at 0.46, which is higher than the R2 from the model with country dummies.
In these models, the coecient of exports as a fraction of GDP is positive and statistically
signicant (column (5)), and the estimate is of similar magnitude as the one reported in
columns (1) and (2).
We nish by studying other trade-related determinants of industry skill premiums. We
look at unit values as proxies for product quality. A model of the impact of quality upgrading
on wage inequality (or increases in skill premiums) is developed and estimated by Verhoogen
(2008). We also assess product variety, measured by the dispersion of unit values within
16industries, as a correlate of skill premiums. The argument is that product dierentiation
may matter. Perhaps rms in sectors with wide scope for product dierentiation can exercise
monopoly power, charge higher mark-ups, and perhaps pass-on those prots to their workers.
Alternatively, product dierentiation itself may require skills.
The calculation of unit values using data from the U.N. Comtrade database is not straight-
forward and inevitably brings measurement errors. We used three dierent measures for unit
values in order to check for the robustness of the results.
First, in Comtrade, many recorded transactions for a single HS code appear with dierent
quantity codes, making comparison between unit values for a single HS code impossible. To
address this concern, for a given HS code, we pooled data from all countries and picked
the quantity code that is reported more frequently. For the calculation of unit values, we
only considered those transactions that were reported in the \most frequent quantity code,"
to make sure that unit values for a given HS code are expressed in the same units across
countries. Unit values are then aggregated at the ISIC Rev 3, 2-digit level by taking weighted
averages (weights are given by the importance of a given HS code exports on total exports
of the corresponding 2-digit ISIC industry). The measure for the dispersion of unit values is
the variance of unit values across HS codes within a country and 2-digit ISIC industry.
Second, unit values are highly dispersed, and therefore we used the median unit values
(without any weighting) as a second measure of unit values. The corresponding indicator of
dispersion is still the variance of unit values.
Third, to account for outliers we trimmed the top and bottom ve percent of the ob-
servations on unit values. In turn, we calculated the weighted average within countries and
2-digit ISIC industries as in the rst approach.
The regression model is similar to equation (7). That is, we regress the skill premium
in industry j and country c on the measures of unit values and the variance of unit values
plus industry dummies and national characteristics instead of country dummies, namely the
log of per capita GDP and the ratio of skilled to unskilled endowments.11 Our main results
are in Table 13. Each panel in the table corresponds to one of the three indicators of unit
11These results are not reported for the sake of brevity.
17values.
Our rst conclusion is that neither unit values nor the dispersion of unit values explain the
industry-skill premium. While these results appear robust, it is always possible that they are
the consequence of noise in the unit values. For instance, in specication (C), where we trim
the top and bottom 5% of the unit values, the dispersion in unit value becomes signicant
in some regressions. This hints at the relevance of the scope for product dierentiation.
Nevertheless, the key nding from Table 13 is that in all models that control for unit val-
ues, sectoral exports are still signicant in explaining skill premiums. Also, the magnitudes
of the estimates are similar to those in Table 12. We interpret this result as a robustness
check that supports the view that exports signicantly aect the premium paid for skills at
the industry level.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studied the returns to schooling in Latin America and the Caribbean and its
link to exports. We rst estimated and described national skill premiums for over ve
million workers from sixteen countries. Motivated by recent models featuring limited inter-
industry factor mobility, we estimated industry-specic skill-premiums for sixty 2-digit ISIC
sectors. Finally, we investigated reduced-form regressions linking these industry-specic skill
premiums with sectoral exports.
An interesting and previously unknown nding is that unobserved industry- and country-
specic eects jointly explain over 60 percent of the observed variance in the skill premium
in our sample. Each set of factors has about the same explanatory power for skill premiums
in manufacturing sectors. It is thus not clear that industrial policies would succeed anymore
than industry-neutral national policies in changing the skill premium. In addition, sectoral
exports are related to sectoral skill premiums: sectors with higher exports pay higher wage-
skilled premiums. This evidence supports recent trade theories linking exports to wages and
to skills, as in Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2009) and Verhoogen (2008), and highlights
the need for further research to understand the mechanisms at work.
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Graph displays skill premiums that are industry and country specic.
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Industry Exports and Industry Skill Premium



















23Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH‐C) semestre II 2004, 2005 167,770
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) 2002, 2003, 2004 1,169,598
Chile Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN) 2000, 2003 509,825
Colombia Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) 2001, 2003, 2004 315,528
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (HPM) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 173,403
Dominican Rep. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo (ENFT) onda Octubre 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 184,611
Ecuador Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo (ENEMDU) 2003, 2004, 2005 242,410
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EHPM) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 409,093
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional de Empleo e Ingresos (ENEI) 2002, 2003, 2004 91,343
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM) 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006 206,868




Panama Encuesta de Hogares (EH) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 217,173
Paraguay Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 137,709
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 409,665
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 337,001
Table lists the surveys used in the estimation of the national‐level and industry‐specific skil premiums
TABLE 1. Description of Household Surveys
Obs. Country Survey years Name of Survey
23All Male Female All Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Argentina 10.63 0.52 0.49 0.53 0.23 0.24 0.21
Brazil 6.94 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.28 0.33 0.25
Chile 8.89 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.23 0.24 0.23
Colombia 8.53 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.56 0.56 0.55
Costa Rica 7.55 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.36 0.38 0.34
Dominican Rep. 7.96 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.34
Ecuador 7.95 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32
El Salvador 6.20 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.17
Guatemala 5.70 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.27 0.32 0.22
Honduras 5.99 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.37 0.24
Mexico 7.94 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.41 0.45 0.37
Nicaragua 5.31 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.46 0.49 0.42
Panama 8.81 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.30 0.27 0.33
Paraguay 7.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.22
Peru 7.85 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.46 0.46 0.47













24Skill Premium Semi‐skilled Highly‐skilled Skill Premium Semi‐Skilled Highly‐Skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Argentina 0.48 0.39 0.83 ‐0.05*** ‐0.06*** ‐0.04*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.021]
Brazil 0.98 0.84 1.15 0.14*** 0.1*** 0.14***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.012]
Chile 0.60 0.40 1.16 0.02** ‐0.02** 0.09***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]
Colombia 0.90 0.59 1.14 ‐0.04*** ‐0.1*** ‐0.01
[0.008] [0.01] [0.009] [0.014] [0.02] [0.016]
Costa Rica 0.73 0.56 0.98 0.05* 0.01 0.07*
[0.016] [0.018] [0.022] [0.03] [0.035] [0.042]
Dominican Rep. 0.49 0.28 0.91 ‐0.05*** ‐0.07*** 0.02
[0.007] [0.008] [0.01] [0.013] [0.015] [0.018]
Ecuador 0.53 0.39 0.90 ‐0.13*** ‐0.17*** ‐0.05***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.013] [0.015] [0.018]
El Salvador 0.47 0.38 0.95 ‐0.03*** ‐0.09*** 0.03
[0.006] [0.006] [0.01] [0.01] [0.011] [0.019]
Guatemala 0.74 0.62 1.07 ‐0.2*** ‐0.19*** ‐0.32***
[0.02] [0.022] [0.032] [0.036] [0.04] [0.063]
Honduras 0.72 0.55 1.03 0.00 ‐0.08*** ‐0.06
[0.013] [0.014] [0.02] [0.023] [0.026] [0.037]
Mexico 0.68 0.46 1.03 ‐0.14*** ‐0.28*** ‐0.06**
[0.012] [0.014] [0.016] [0.022] [0.026] [0.029]
Nicaragua 0.74 0.45 1.02 0.15*** 0.02 0.22***
[0.023] [0.03] [0.03] [0.042] [0.057] [0.055]
Panama 0.48 0.33 0.89 ‐0.12*** ‐0.13*** 0.03
[0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.015] [0.016] [0.02]
Paraguay 0.54 0.44 0.94 ‐0.04* ‐0.04* 0.03
[0.012] [0.013] [0.02] [0.021] [0.023] [0.035]
Peru 0.43 0.26 0.72 ‐0.13*** ‐0.15*** ‐0.13***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.012] [0.015] [0.016]
Uruguay 0.38 0.24 0.62 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 0.06**









25Element. Some HS HS Some College
Diploma College Degree
Argentina 0.19 0.32 0.52 0.72 1.02
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.015]
Brazil 0.27 0.32 0.56 0.96 1.50
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Chile 0.15 0.25 0.51 0.89 1.35
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.007]
Colombia 0.18 0.31 0.52 0.92 1.38
[0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.013] [0.011]
Costa Rica 0.15 0.34 0.56 1.01 1.41
[0.019] [0.022] [0.024] [0.024] [0.038]
Dominican Rep. 0.14 0.19 0.30 0.50 1.02
[0.01] [0.009] [0.01] [0.012] [0.011]
Ecuador 0.20 0.30 0.52 0.81 1.15
[0.009] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014]
El Salvador 0.14 0.20 0.35 0.59 1.01
[0.007] [0.012] [0.007] [0.011] [0.01]
Guatemala 0.26 0.37 0.78 0.99 1.36
[0.017] [0.023] [0.022] [0.037] [0.034]
Honduras 0.23 0.42 0.74 0.95 1.47
[0.012] [0.016] [0.016] [0.026] [0.023]
Mexico 0.24 0.40 0.70 0.97 1.32
[0.015] [0.015] [0.018] [0.023] [0.02]
Nicaragua 0.13 0.28 0.41 0.61 1.17
[0.021] [0.02] [0.026] [0.039] [0.031]
Panama 0.19 0.30 0.51 0.80 1.23
[0.012] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016]
Paraguay 0.18 0.37 0.58 0.74 1.12
[0.012] [0.014] [0.019] [0.019] [0.021]
Peru 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.49 0.79
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.01]
Uruguay 0.12 0.32 0.41 0.60 1.01






Arg Bra Chi Col Cos Dom Ecu Els Gua Hon Mex Nic Pan Par Per Uru
Mean 0.62 0.50 1.00 0.71 0.86 0.71 0.54 0.55 0.48 0.69 0.67 0.62 0.71 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.36
Median 0.58 0.43 0.98 0.64 0.82 0.67 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.72 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.32
Std. Dev. 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.34 0.52 0.29 0.32 0.26 0.42 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.22
10th Percentile 0.23 0.16 0.71 0.37 0.53 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.15
90th Percentile 1.07 0.83 1.29 1.13 1.22 1.22 0.86 0.78 0.73 1.14 1.17 1.03 1.41 0.75 0.83 0.83 0.69
Number of Coeff. 764 53 57 50 57 53 50 52 45 36 48 47 33 46 42 50 45
  Positive 743 52 57 50 56 50 49 49 44 35 47 46 31 45 42 47 43
  Pos. Signif.






27Obs Mean Above p50 Above p25 Below p75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
99 Extra‐territorial organizations and bodies 8 1.12 88% 75% 13%
73 Research and development 9 0.99 89% 56% 11%
74 Other business activities 16 0.94 100% 88% 0%
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 15 0.9 53% 33% 40%
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 16 0.88 88% 44% 0%
26 Manufacture of other non‐metallic mineral products 16 0.87 94% 50% 6%
70 Real estate activities 15 0.87 87% 67% 13%
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 7 0.84 86% 71% 14%
14 Other mining and quarrying 13 0.82 54% 38% 15%
85 Health and social work 16 0.82 88% 63% 0%
27 Manufacture of basic metals 12 0.46 33% 8% 42%
55 Hotels and restaurants 16 0.45 0% 0% 63%
71 Renting of machinery, equipment and household goods 13 0.45 23% 23% 54%
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 16 0.43 13% 0% 50%
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 16 0.43 31% 0% 50%
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 16 0.43 19% 6% 50%
93 Other service activities 16 0.42 13% 0% 63%
62 Air transport 12 0.41 42% 25% 42%
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 16 0.35 0% 0% 81%








28All  Arg Bra Chi Col Cos Dom Ecu Els Gua Hon Mex Nic Pan Par Per Uru
Mean 0.44 0.39 0.88 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.56 0.49 0.38 0.56 0.31 0.39 0.27 0.24
Median 0.41 0.36 0.84 0.42 0.52 0.52 0.29 0.39 0.37 0.50 0.46 0.43 0.47 0.31 0.40 0.27 0.23
P10 0.11 0.09 0.64 0.27 0.10 0.16 0.05 ‐0.05 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.16 ‐0.12 0.06
P90 0.84 0.76 1.19 0.76 0.81 1.05 0.65 0.60 0.72 1.31 0.96 0.69 0.97 0.55 0.67 0.60 0.50
Std. Dev. 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.56 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.45 0.29 0.24 0.41 0.20 0.21 0.27 0.19
Number of Coeff. 761 53 57 50 56 51 50 52 45 36 48 47 33 46 42 50 45
  Positive 716 50 57 50 52 47 46 46 42 34 46 45 32 44 41 43 41
  Pos. Signif.




Mean 0.96 0.85 1.02 1.23 1.14 1.05 0.91 0.90 1.02 0.93 0.98 1.06 0.85 0.87 1.02 0.77 0.64
Median 0.95 0.83 1.05 1.19 1.04 0.96 0.94 0.96 1.04 1.01 0.96 1.06 0.87 0.88 0.96 0.78 0.60
P10 0.44 0.45 0.61 0.83 0.60 0.32 0.49 0.42 0.55 0.16 0.49 0.48 0.18 0.45 0.65 0.29 0.09
P90 1.44 1.22 1.35 1.66 1.66 2.00 1.28 1.35 1.44 1.49 1.52 1.63 1.54 1.34 1.53 1.29 1.21
Std. Dev. 0.47 0.47 0.32 0.41 0.52 0.69 0.27 0.42 0.42 0.50 0.48 0.43 0.56 0.37 0.47 0.40 0.41
Number of Coeff. 753 53 57 50 57 52 49 52 44 36 47 47 28 47 40 49 45
  Positive 737 52 57 50 57 50 49 49 43 35 45 47 27 46 39 48 43
  Pos. Signif.








29Obs Mean Above p50 Above p25 Below p75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 6 1.43 100% 50% 0%
99 Extra‐territorial organizations and bodies 8 1.39 88% 50% 0%
74 Other business activities 16 1.23 94% 69% 0%
26 Manufacture of other non‐metallic mineral products 16 1.22 81% 56% 13%
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 12 1.19 50% 42% 17%
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 16 1.17 81% 31% 6%
2 Forestry, logging and related service activities 13 1.15 54% 46% 23%
13 Mining of metal ores 10 1.15 50% 20% 30%
45 Construction 16 1.15 75% 31% 0%
17 Manufacture of textiles 15 1.14 67% 47% 7%
62 Air transport 12 0.83 42% 33% 58%
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manuf. of leather products 15 0.81 47% 20% 40%
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities 9 0.81 67% 44% 33%
66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 14 0.8 36% 14% 36%
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 16 0.73 31% 13% 50%
72 Computer and related activities 12 0.71 42% 8% 42%
55 Hotels and restaurants 16 0.68 0% 0% 69%
71 Renting of machinery, equipment and household goods 13 0.66 38% 23% 62%
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 16 0.59 0% 0% 75%




















































322 ‐0.005 0.008 29 0.023 0.008 63 0.032 0.007
5 ‐0.021 0.007 30 0.046 0.018 64 0.051 0.007
10 ‐0.003 0.022 31 0.037 0.010 65 0.050 0.006
11 0.030 0.012 32 0.074 0.014 66 0.046 0.009
13 0.024 0.009 33 0.032 0.012 67 0.063 0.013
14 0.016 0.009 34 0.025 0.010 70 0.029 0.007
15 0.012 0.005 35 0.022 0.010 71 0.023 0.011
16 0.021 0.010 36 ‐0.004 0.006 72 0.069 0.011
17 0.034 0.007 37 0.043 0.018 73 0.060 0.012
18 0.001 0.005 40 0.040 0.007 74 0.059 0.005
19 0.003 0.007 41 0.014 0.007 75 0.038 0.004
20 0.003 0.007 45 0.002 0.004 80 0.038 0.004
21 0.037 0.009 50 0.012 0.006 85 0.060 0.005
22 0.035 0.008 51 0.038 0.006 90 0.003 0.008
23 0.057 0.013 52 0.005 0.005 91 0.033 0.007
24 0.051 0.007 53 0.025 0.007 92 0.029 0.006
25 0.024 0.008 55 ‐0.008 0.005 93 ‐0.007 0.006
26 0.028 0.007 60 ‐0.012 0.005 95 ‐0.044 0.005
27 0.013 0.009 61 0.036 0.011 98 0.071 0.046
28 0.005 0.006 62 0.038 0.012 99 0.058 0.011
Industry Coefficient Std Error Industry Coefficient
The table lists the industry fixed effects from regressions including both country and industry effects.
TABLE 11. Industry Effects
Std Error Industry Coefficient Std Error
33(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log Exports/GDP 0.0028*** 0.0033*** 0.0004 ‐0.0002 0.0027**





Country Dummies No No Yes Yes No
Industry Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 273 273 273 273 273




34(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A
Log Unit value 0.0015 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009
(0.001) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0022)
log Var(Unit_value) 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.00005
(0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0009)
log Exports/GDP 0.0025** 0.0025** 0.0025**
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273
R‐squared 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47
PANEL B
Log Unit value 0.0035 0.0026 0.0022 0.0017
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0038)
log Var(Unit_value) 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
log Exports/GDP 0.0026** 0.0025** 0.0025**
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273
R‐squared 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47
PANEL C
Log Unit value 0.0023* 0.0005 0.0019 0.0003
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0023)
log Var(Unit_value) 0.0011** 0.0009 0.0009* 0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.001)
log Exports/GDP 0.0025** 0.0024** 0.0024**
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273
R‐squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
TABLE 13. Export Unit Values and the Skill Premium
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent denoted by ***, ** and *
35